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ABSTRACT 
According to the glass ceiling hypothesis evidenced in developed countries, there exist larger gender 
pay gaps at the upper tail of the wage distribution. In this paper, we investigate the relevance of a glass 
ceiling effect in Morocco using a matched worker-firm data set of more than 8000 employees and 
850 employers. We estimate linear and quantile earnings regressions which account for firm 
heterogeneity and perform a quantile decomposition. We also focus on the within-firm gender 
earnings gap using information on the firms’ characteristics. Our results show that the gender earnings 
gap is higher at the top of the distribution than at the bottom in Morocco. The gender gap widens in 
the upper tail of the earnings distribution when controlling for firm specific components. The glass 
ceiling effect is also reinforced over time in Morocco as high wage male workers benefit from higher 
earnings growth than women. 
Key Words : Gender wage gap, glass ceiling, quantile regressions, matched worker-firm data 
RESUMÉ 
Selon l’hypothèse du plafond de verre mise en évidence dans les pays développés, il existe un écart 
salarial selon le genre plus important en haut de la distribution des salaires. Dans cet article, nous 
examinons la pertinence de l’existence d’un plafond de verre dans le cas marocain à partir de données 
appariées employeurs-employés regroupant plus de 8 000 travailleurs répartis dans 850 entreprises 
manufacturières. Nous estimons des équations de gains linéaires et par quantiles conditionnels prenant 
en compte l’hétérogénéité des entreprises et nous proposons une décomposition des gains par 
quantiles. Nous examinons également les déterminants de l’écart de revenus selon le genre intra-
entreprise en utilisant l’information sur les caractéristiques des établissements. Nos résultats montrent 
que l’écart de revenus selon le sexe est plus élevé en haut de la distribution des gains qu’en bas de 
celle-ci. L’écart de gains se creuse en haut de la distribution lorsque sont contrôlées les 
caractéristiques spécifiques des entreprises. L’effet de plafond de verre pourrait également se renforcer 
au cours du temps dans ces entreprises marocaines dans la mesure où les hommes à hauts salaires 
bénéficient d’une croissance des gains plus élevée que leurs homologues féminins.  
Mots clés : Écart de revenus selon le genre, plafond de verre, régressions de quantile, données 
appariées employeurs-employés, Maroc 
JEL Code : J24, J31, O12 
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Almost every industrialised countries labour market is characterised by a significant gender pay gap 
(Altonji and Blank, 1999). This is the case for instance in Europe, despite of laws mandating an equal 
treatment of women and men in the workplace. Not only female and male employees do not receive 
equal pay for equal work, but it has more recently been shown that the gender wage vary in fact 
throughout the wage distribution. Albrecht et alii (2003) exhibit a sharp acceleration of the gap in the 
upper tail of the wage distribution in Sweden, which is interpreted as a glass ceiling effect. Very 
similar conclusions have been evidenced in many European countries (Arulampalam et alii, 2004, 
Gardeazabal and Ugidos, 2005). 
While there is a consensus on the fact that men outearn women, measuring the gender wage gap across 
the wage distribution is far from being straightforward. A first difficulty is that many women do not 
take part in the labour market, so that sample selection issues may be of importance. Secondly, the 
type of sector or of firm is likely to play a major role in explaining variations in individual earnings. 
Matched worker-firm data are then ideally needed to study the gender pay gap, since such data allows 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level on earnings differentials (Meng, 2004, Meng 
and Meurs, 2004). 
In developing countries, reducing gender inequality is a major subject of concern in the fight against 
poverty. For instance, under the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiative that concerns over 
sixty of the world's poorest countries, policies designed to counter gender discrimination are among 
the most often recommended solutions to combat poverty (see Cling et alii, 2003). Furthermore, the 
third goal of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) is aimed at reducing gender inequalities. 
Despite of the policy implications related to gender discrimination, empirical studies which have 
attempted to measure the gender pay gap in developing countries are not so frequent.  
Appleton et alii (1999) note that there is undeniably very little literature on the gender pay gap in 
Africa. Drawing on the recent meta-analysis of studies on the gender pay gap presented in 
Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005), we can evaluate that about 3 percent of these studies stem 
from African data out of all the empirical literature on the topic since the 1960s. The situation is even 
worse when turning to distributional approaches of the gender pay gap in developing countries. Some 
exceptions are Montenegro (2001) on Chile, Mwabu and Schultz (1996) on South Africa and Said 
(2003) on Egypt. More recently, Fafchamps et alii (2006) have analysed the gender effects on wages 
in African manufacturing. However, the focus of this valuable comparative study is on the mean 
values of male and female wages.  
The purpose of our contribution is to investigate the gender pay gap along the whole wage distribution 
using a unique matched employer-employee data set from Morocco. In that country, the progress of 
labour earnings has remained very limited over the recent period, owing to the poor economic context. 
Skills of the local labour force remain very limited, especially for women, a phenomenon which is 
likely to lead to increased gender pay inequalities in the upper part of the earnings distribution. The 
survey is the Firm Analysis and Competitiveness Survey (FACS) conducted in 2000 by the World 
Bank and the Moroccan Ministry of Trade and Industry. It includes data from 859 manufacturing 
plants. Most of them are small and medium sized-enterprises. The worker survey includes data from 
8 375 workers, 40 percent of which are women.  
We follow different steps to study whether there exists a glass ceiling effect in these manufacturing 
firms of Morocco. First, we estimate quantile regressions on the whole sample of workers (male and 
female) and investigate how the gender pay gap varies across the earnings distribution once we control 
for individual characteristics. Second, we try to control for firm specific effects. Drawing on a 
component principal analysis, we summarize the main information on the firms’ characteristics and 
introduce the computed principal factors stemming from this analysis into the earnings functions. 
Third, we analyse the extent to which returns to exogenous factors differ between men and women. 
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We also provide additional evidence on the gender wage gap and on the factors that influence firms to 
pay different premia for men and women. On the one hand, we implement both mean and quantile 
decomposition of the log gender earnings gap2. On the other hand, we focus on the log wage growth 
within the firm for each worker and examine whether male and female employees receive a similar 
treatment. We also go back to the mean values of the wage gap and compute the difference between 
the male and female firm fixed effects. This difference in fixed effects allows us to disentangle the 
determinants of the within-firm gender earnings gap (Meng, 2004). All these various analyses are 
made possible for the first time in the context of an African country, thanks to the availability of the 
very rich firm-level information. 
Several interesting features of wage determination process in manufacturing firms of Morocco are 
evidenced in the present contribution. First, as in many developed countries, we evidence a glass 
ceiling effect in Morocco since the earnings gap is substantially higher at the top of the distribution 
than at the bottom. Second, as shown by the quantile decomposition, a large part of the gender 
earnings gap is due to differences in individual characteristics, especially at the top of the wage 
distribution. Third, it matters to account for firms’ characteristics as the gender earnings gap is 
increased when adding the firm features into the earnings regressions, especially in the upper tail of 
the earnings distribution. Finally, we find that high wage male workers benefit from higher earnings 
growth than women.  
The remainder of our paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the literature on 
the glass ceiling effect. In Section 3, we present the FACS data and comment on the descriptive 
statistics of the samples of firms and workers. We present the results from various linear and quantile 
regressions of the log earnings in Section 4. Additional issues dealing with quantile decomposition, 
wage growth and difference in firms fixed effects are in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2 GENDER WAGE GAP AND GLASS CEILING EFFECT: A BRIEF REVIEW 
Drawing on Swedish data from 1998, Albrecht et alii (2003) estimate quantile regressions and find 
that the gender log wage gap accelerates in the upper tail of the wage distribution. A similar pattern is 
evidenced at the beginning of the 1990s, but not in the prior two decades. According to the data, the 
wage pattern is mainly due to gender differences in the returns to labour market characteristics, more 
than to gender differences in the characteristics themselves. Several studies have attempted to replicate 
these findings in other European countries. 
In West Germany, the gender wage gap has narrowed substantially in the lower part of the wage 
distribution from 1975 to 1995, while this is not the case in its upper part (Fitzenberg and Wunderlich, 
2001). In Denmark, the wage gap exhibits an insignificant narrowing at the bottom of the wage 
distribution, then a small and significant increase at the mean, finally a large and significant rise at the 
top (Datta Gupta et alii, 2006). In Spain, gender wage differences increase with the quantile index, the 
gap reaching a maximum at the ninth decile (Gardeazabal and Ugidos, 2005). However, it is strongly 
affected by education (De la Rica et alii, 2005)3. 
A more comparative analysis is proposed in Arulampalam et alii (2004), who estimate quantile 
regressions to investigate how gender affects the shape of the wage distribution in eleven European 
countries, respectively for the private and public sectors. Their results show that gender pay gaps are 
larger at the top of the wage distribution in four countries, Denmark, Finland, Italy and the 
Netherlands, which favours the glass ceiling hypothesis. At the same time, gender pay gaps are wider 
at the bottom of the wage distribution in Austria, Belgium, France and Spain, but they are all the same 
larger at the top than at the bottom of the distribution. Also, in contrast to the public sector, the private 
sector exhibits very large wage gaps. 
                                                     
2 The difference between the male and female earnings distribution is decomposed into one component due to differences in labour market 
characteristics and one related to disparities in rewards for these characteristics. 
3  On the one hand, the gap is wider at the top than at the bottom for workers with high education (college or tertiary). Conversely, the gap 
appears much smaller at the top than at the bottom of the distribution for the group with low education. This glass floor pattern is 
interpreted as a statistical discrimination exerted by employers. 
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Taking firm characteristics into account may be relevant when estimating the gender wage gap. Jellal 
et alii (2007) use a French employer-employee matched data set and provide quantile estimates of the 
magnitude of the glass ceiling effect, with controls of the firms’ features in the earnings equations. 
These authors find that there exists a glass ceiling effect in France with a strong increase in the gender 
earnings gap above the 75th percentile of the distribution, which is mainly due to differences in the 
returns to observed characteristics. Importantly, the magnitude of the gender gap is significantly 
overstated at the top of the distribution when the impact of the firms’ qualitative aspects is omitted 
into the earnings equations. 
Economists have not really paid attention to the situation of the African countries with respect to the 
glass ceiling effect. The few studies that have attempted to deal with the gender wage gap in Africa 
have mainly focused on its magnitude evaluated at the mean of the wage distribution4. Among them, 
however, the study of Fafchamps et alii (2006) is of particular interest since these authors make use of 
matched employer-employee data from eleven African countries, including the survey on Morocco we 
use in this paper. A significant gender wage gap is found in the different selected countries5. 
Nevertheless, once controls for firm heterogeneity are introduced, the magnitude and significance of 
the gender dummy in earnings equations fall in most countries. This suggests that the gender wage gap 
may be due in large part to sorting among firms. While on average the return to education is higher for 
women, the difference is not significant in seven of the eleven countries. In three countries, women get 
paid less than men on average, but the gap is lower for educated women and it even disappears for 
women with ten to twelve years of education. So, Fafchamps et alii (2006) conclude that “women 
must be better educated in order to compete with men for better paid jobs, perhaps because of 
statistical discrimination”. This seems at odd with the glass ceiling phenomenon observed in 
industrialised countries. 
Interestingly, Morocco tells a somewhat different story as compared to the other African countries 
(Fafchamps et alii, 2006). The return to education is significantly higher for males, while the female 
dummy in the earnings function is positive for women with very little education. At higher levels of 
education (above three years of schooling), women get paid less than men. Also, gender differences in 
the education coefficient are no longer significant once controls for occupation and firm heterogeneity 
are introduced6. Importantly, the focus remains on the mean values of male and female earnings, 
whereas a distributional approach is undoubtedly needed to disentangle the various forces at work in 
the earnings determination process across sexes. 
3 DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
3.1 The Moroccan context 
Morocco is a semi-developed economy characterised by a rapidly evolving working population. While 
the job seekers are abundant, the skills of the Moroccan labour force are limited. More than 50 percent 
of adults are illiterate, this proportion being much higher for women (70 percent). During the last 
decade, social indicators substantially improved due to growth in public social expenditure and focus 
on rural areas (World Bank, 2001). Yet, poverty and vulnerability were found to be on the rise. The 
morose economic context during the 1990s, the period referred to in this article, hampered the 
progress of labour earnings.  
The labour legislation underpins the level of wages in Morocco. Unions have a strong influence and 
there exists an official minimum wage, the so-called SMIG (Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel 
Garanti). The latter has played a crucial role for the formation of wages in the recent period. This has 
                                                     
4 See Nordman and Roubaud (2005) for a review. 
5 These countries are Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
6 However, possible nonlinearities in the returns to education are not considered, while the hypothesis of constant returns is increasingly 
challenged especially in developing countries. In Africa for instance, returns to education are most often found to be convex (Söderbom 
et alii, 2004, Kuepie et alii, 2006). 
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not always been the case since real wages of the Moroccan manufacturing sector declined, while the 
real SMIG increased by about 25 percent during the 1980s. During the 1990s, the distribution of 
wages roughly stuck to the evolution of the SMIG. More precisely, the SMIG adjustments over time 
rather followed the evolutions of the mean urban wage more than proportionally (World Bank, 1994). 
If the minimum wage is not effectively enforced in the informal sector of the economy, it is well 
implemented throughout the industrialised and unionised sectors in which most workers’ earnings 
stand above the minimum wage7. These workers are generally paid between 13 and 16 months salary, 
including bonuses, each year.  
Despite the importance of this country in the Mediterranean region, only a few articles deal with the 
functioning of the labour market in Morocco. Undoubtedly, the reason is the lack of appropriate data. 
Noticeable exceptions are the studies of Lane et alii (1999) and Agenor and El Aynaoui (2003). The 
former underlines the stagnation of the average wage in the manufacturing sector over the 1990s. 
Considerable gaps in average wages persist across sectors. The least remunerative industrial sectors 
are those of leather and confection, while the most profitable are the sectors of drinks and tobacco. In 
1995, the average wage in the latter sectors was more than three times higher than that of the 
confection sector. Also, most women work in low paying sectors, such as textiles and leather. The 
stagnation of wages may be partly explained by the fact that the least remunerative industries have had 
the biggest part of job creation during the past decade. Skills of the workforce and exposure to 
competition explain wage disparities across sectors (Clerides et alii, 1998)8.  
Until recently, working relations were governed by legislation dating back to 1921, with emphasis on 
job security. It was, in particular, very expensive to dismiss permanent workers. The law provided for 
a 48-hours maximum workweek with no more than 10 hours any single day, premium pay for 
overtime, paid public and annual holidays, and minimum conditions for health and safety, including 
the prohibition of night work for women and minors. However, these norms are not universally 
observed in the informal sector. Nowadays, the labour market may benefit from the recently adopted 
labour code (July 2003), which encourages flexibility and contains procedures for conciliation. The 
new code also reflects international conventions regarding the protection of children, women, 
handicapped people, and workers and unions’ rights. 
To date, there is a lack of empirical evidence on the extent of gender wage differentials in Morocco, 
which is the primary interest of this paper. To fill in this gap, we benefit from detailed data on both 
firms and workers. This allows us to control for firm-specific effects on earnings differentials. Also, 
the use of a distributional approach sheds light on differences in gender inequality between low wage 
and high wage workers. 
3.2 The FAC Survey 
The objective of the Firm Analysis and Competitiveness Survey (FACS hereafter) was to strengthen 
capacity in the Moroccan Ministry of Trade and Industry to systematically collect and analyse data 
from manufacturing firms using a wide ranging questionnaire. More specifically, the FACS was 
designed to provide the Government with a quantitative tool to monitor industry performance, provide 
firms with a checklist of competitive practices and benchmark indicators, and foster Business-
Government dialogue by measuring the impact of reforms and refocusing the agenda on the most 
relevant and pressing concerns. 
The scope of the survey is comprehensive. The data collected can be used to analyse a variety of 
issues directly or indirectly related to public policy, such as export incentives and performance, 
technological improvement, upgrading of human capital and functioning of the labour market, 
government-business relations, or the pricing and quality of public services for industry. The 
                                                     
7 According to Benhayoun et alii (2001), only 13 percent of the wage earners in the private formal sector are unfairly paid a salary lower 
than the minimum wage. 
8 Other factors may play a role, as the employment duration, the seasonal features of jobs and on-the-job training. Legally, the minimum 
wage is not applied for certain types of employees, such as young workers below 18 years old, temporary workers or trainees. Also, in 
1986, at least half of the firms of the Moroccan private manufacturing sector and 40 percent of large companies were paying unskilled 
workers an average wage lower than the SMIG.  
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availability of worker-level data provides an opportunity to investigate the link between firm-level 
responses to macro policies and the economic fortunes/misfortunes of workers.  
The FACS-Morocco is based on the notion that the workplace is the microdata unit where labour 
supply and demand is resolved. For this reason, FACS-Morocco collected data both on establishment 
characteristics and on a sample of employees in each workplace (on average 10). The survey 
instrument was a written questionnaire. The Moroccan Census of Manufactures, which is organised 
yearly by the Ministry of Trade and Industry since 1985, was used as the establishment sampling 
frame. The investigators, i.e. the Moroccan Ministry of Trade and Industry and the World Bank, 
decided to focus on the population of formal establishments with 10 or more employees in seven 
industries: Electronics, Textiles, Garments, Processed Food Products, Pharmaceuticals, Leather and 
Shoes products, and Plastic Products.  
Conducted between October 2000 and February 2001, the FACS-Morocco collected data from 
859 plants, 78 percent of them being small and medium sized-firms9. The collected data are 
representative of the sampling frame – which is the overall manufacturing industry – in terms of 
employment, production and exportation (see World Bank, 2002). Some descriptive statistics of the 
firm characteristics are shown in Table 1. 60 percent of the sample firms are located in and around 
Casablanca, and 60 percent of the plants are in Textile and Garments. 57 percent of the firms are 
limited liability companies (SARL) and 36 percent are corporations (SA). About 20 percent of the 
surveyed firms have some foreign ownership; 15 percent have a majority foreign ownership – mostly 
by foreign individuals. Some 5 percent of surveyed firms can be described as ‘multinationals’. 
56 percent of the surveyed manufacturing firms export all or part of their output, and exporting firms 
export on average 43 percent of their output. Note that 62 percent of the firms have positive profits 
(hereafter ‘profitable’ firms). 
Let us have a look at the firms’ labour force. About 13 percent of the surveyed employers declared 
having unionised employees while the share of these unionised workers reaches, on average, about 
10 percent of the total manpower. It is interesting to note that only two firms have implemented piece-
rate pay systems for non-qualified employees. Besides, highly labour intensive firms with labour costs 
being superior to 75 percent of the total costs represent only a small proportion of the firm sample 
(5 percent), while the firms with skilled production employees being the dominant occupation (among 
four other worker categories such as managers and executives, admin, unskilled production 
employees, and off-production employees) represent 32 percent of the surveyed establishments. 
Moreover, 12 percent of the firms display a share of managers higher than 10 percent of the total 
employees. These figures are indicative of a somewhat decent representation of firms with highly 
skilled workers in our sample which is crucial in order to assess the relevance of the glass ceiling 
hypothesis. 
                                                     
9 A random sample of 1000 establishments and a replacement sample of 500 were drawn by industry, the choice of regions being dictated 
by the geographical concentration of firms in the selected industries. 
 9 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the firm characteristics 
 
Variables Mean Standard deviation Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
 Unrestricted sample Restricted sample 
Dummies for sector of affiliation     
Garment 0.367  0.427  
Food  0.097  0.088  
Textile 0.233  0.237  
Leather 0.080  0.064  
Electrical 0.044  0.034  
Chemicals 0.090  0.078  
Plastics 0.089  0.071  
     
Firm characteristics     
Primarily exporting firms (1 if yes) 0.565  0.654  
Number of local competitors for the principal product 161.154 402.503 176.649 406.667 
Market share 11.308 19.752 11.530 20.023 
Share of female employees 0.556 2.118 0.675 2.524 
Firm size (1: <50 employees, 2: 50<employees<150, 3: 
employees>150) 1.800 0.776 1.883 0.787 
Are the employees unionised? (1 if yes) 0.132  0.112  
Share of unionised employees 0.097 0.271 0.084 0.253 
Share of piece-rate pay for non-qualified employees 0.006 0.066 0.001 0.017 
Qualified employees being dominant occupation (1 if yes) 0.320  0.337  
Share of managers higher than 10% of the total employees (1 
if yes) 0.120  0.100  
Highly labour intensive firms in 1998 (1 if labour costs > 
75% total costs) 0.050  0.053  
Firms with more than 75% foreign owned (1 if yes) 0.041  0.049  
Profitable firms (1 if yes) 0.623  0.632  
Share of days lost due to absenteeism 0.024 0.056 0.024 0.057 
Share of days lost due to strike 0.002 0.024 0.002 0.028 
Share of sales lost due to theft 0.003 0.011 0.003 0.012 
Share of executives promoted in 1999 0.014 0.119 0.005 0.040 
Number of on-the-job day-trainees in 1999 124.8 1887.5 162.3 2264.3 
Sales in 1999 (in Dirhams) 23502 49761 26083 55168 
Value of production in 1999 (in Dirhams) 22196 45340 24628 49735 
Number of observations 855 590 
Source: FACS Morocco 2000 
The unrestricted sample includes all the firms of the FACS (excluding four of them with missing values) while the restricted sample 
comprises firms which do not have at least two male and two female employees. 
To test the glass ceiling hypothesis, one novelty of our approach is to control for firm level variables 
in the analysis of earnings determination. Following Muller and Nordman (2004) and Jellal et alii 
(2007), our approach consists of summarising the main statistical information on the firms’ 
characteristics using a multivariate analysis and introducing the computed principal components 
(factors) stemming from this analysis into the earnings functions. Using factors may be seen as a 
further step with respect to those studies which have added mean firm variables into earnings 
functions, individual characteristics being controlled for.  
By contrast with firms’ fixed effects that are commonly introduced in wage regressions, the principal 
factors suggest qualitative characteristics of the firms. Specifically, we use a principal component 
analysis (PCA) to summarise the information about the surveyed establishments10. This method is 
based on the calculation of the inertia axes for a cloud of points that represents the data in table format. 
As long as the computed factors account for most of the firm heterogeneity bias, this approach allows 
us to obtain consistent estimates of the returns to worker characteristics and of the gender wage gap. 
                                                     
10 In principal component analysis, a set of variables is transformed into orthogonal components, which are linear combinations of the 
variables and have maximum variance subject to being uncorrelated with one another. Typically, the first few components account for a 
large proportion of the total variance of the original variables, and hence can be used to summarize the original data. The computed 
factors were rotated using an oblique rotation. As in Muller and Nordman (2004) and Jellal et alii (2007), we have tried many other 
techniques of factor analysis, which all lead to similar conclusions.  
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The complete list, definitions and descriptive statistics of the firms’ characteristics introduced in the 
PCA appear in Table 1. 
For our purpose, the first ten inertia axes (the estimated factors which are linear components of all the 
firm’s characteristics) concentrate a large proportion of the total variance of the original variables (63 
percent) and reflect, therefore, a fair amount of the relevant information about the firm’s 
characteristics11. The correlation coefficients of the firms’ characteristics with the first ten factors are 
used for the interpretation of the computed factors. The other factors represent a negligible amount of 
the statistical information and are dropped from the analysis. Let us note that the ten factors are closely 
associated with the firms’ sectoral belonging and size (factors 2, 5, 6, 7 and 9), the firms’ 
performances such as their sales, production and profitability in 1998-1999 (factors 1 and 10), their 
labour intensity and workforce composition such as whether production, skilled, or executives workers 
are dominant (factors 3, 6 and 8), and the firms’ general features such as their vocation to export and 
status of ownership (factors 1 and 4). The ten factors reflect a wide range of firm characteristics that 
can mainly be summarised by the sector affiliation, size, performances, and workforce composition. 
3.3 Description of the gender wage gap 
The employee survey provides information on 8365 workers, 40 percent of them being women. The 
workers were randomly chosen in their establishment following the idea advocated by Mairesse and 
Greenan (1999). The average age of sampled workers is about 34 years old. The average worker 
interviewed has completed primary school, the number of years of completed schooling being equal to 
8.7. 
In Table 2, we describe the worker sample and the main variables that we use in our analysis. We note 
that men have a slightly higher level of education (8.83 years of schooling instead of 8.55), and their 
potential experience is much higher, with a gap of about 5 years, which is then explained by the fact 
that males are on average older than females (37 versus 31 years old). In fact, a similar pattern is 
observed for tenure in the current firm, which is equal to 8.12 years for men instead of 5.98 for 
women. Also, unsurprisingly, men are more likely to have experienced previous jobs, while women 
report a lower number of children than men. This may be because having children strongly reduces the 
labour force participation of women. 
As male employees have more experience than female employees, gender differences in earnings are 
expected in the FACS data. In Table 2, we compute the log monthly earnings both for men and women 
and report the corresponding values for various points of the earnings distribution12. Albeit 
preliminary, as individual characteristics are not controlled for, these results lead to several interesting 
conclusions. First, at the mean of the sample, the magnitude of the gender earnings gap is equal to 
about 24 percent (7.96-7.72=0.24). Second, the gender gap is not constant across the earnings 
distribution. 
For instance, at the 5th percentile, the gender earnings gap is only equal to 14 percent and it is even 
lower at the first decile (10 percent). The profile remains flat till the 25th percentile (11 percent), but it 
then suddenly increases. Differences between male and female earnings are approximately equal to 20 
percent at the median value, which is still less than the mean gender gap. The gap is much higher on 
the top of the earnings distribution. It is equal to 44 percent at the 75th percentile, 49 percent at the 9th 
decile, and finally 51 percent at the 95th percentile. In Figure 1, we represent the evolution of the log 
gender earnings gap along the earnings distribution and add confidence bands measured at the 95 
percent level. We observe that the gender gap is relatively constant until the 3rd decile, but sharply 
increases after that point. Furthermore, this increasing profile is monotonic till higher levels of wage. 
                                                     
11 The detailed results of the factor analysis are not reported to save space and are available from the authors upon request. 
12 Note than earnings declared in hours, days or weeks have been converted into monthly earnings using the available information on the 
usual number of hours worked per week in the questionnaire.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the worker characteristics 
 
Variables Male Female All 
Earnings    
Log monthly earnings – mean 7.96 7.72 7.87 
Log monthly earnings – 5th percentile 7.31 7.17 7.24 
Log monthly earnings – 10th percentile 7.41 7.31 7.38 
Log monthly earnings – 25th percentile 7.56 7.45 7.51 
Log monthly earnings – 50th percentile 7.80 7.60 7.69 
Log monthly earnings – 75th percentile 8.26 7.82 8.10 
Log monthly earnings – 90th percentile 8.78 8.29 8.63 
Log monthly earnings – 95th percentile 9.21 8.70 9.05 
    
Other characteristics    
Dummy for being female 0 1 0.40 
Dummy for managers 0.06 0.02 0.04 
Dummy for executives 0.11 0.07 0.09 
Dummy for skilled workers/technicians 0.40 0.38 0.38 
Dummy for unskilled production workers 0.27 0.34 0.29 
Dummy non-production employees 0.15 0.18 0.16 
Dummy for apprentices 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Number of children 1.81 0.65 1.32 
Years of completed schooling 8.83 8.55 8.72 
Years of potential experience  
(age – schooling – 6) 22.03 16.91 19.98 
Years of tenure in the current firm 8.12 5.98 7.26 
Number of preceding jobs 1.32 0.97 1.16 
Dummy for received formal training in the 
previous job 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Years of previous unemployment between 
the two previous jobs  0.18 0.17 0.17 
Observations 5015 3320 8335 
Source: FACS Morocco 2000 
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Source: FACS Morocco 2000 
Hence, these preliminary findings suggest that it matters to assess the magnitude of the gender 
earnings gap not only at the mean of the samples, and also that there may exist a glass ceiling in 
Morocco (at least in the manufacturing sector) as in other more developed countries. 
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4 ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE ON THE GLASS CEILING EFFECT 
4.1 Evidence on the mean gender wage gap 
We begin by estimating a simple OLS model on the whole sample of men and women. The different 
variables introduced into the regression are the number of children, years of completed schooling, 
years of potential experience and years of tenure (with a quadratic profile for the last three variables), 
number of preceding jobs, a dummy for receipt of formal training in the previous job and years of 
previous unemployment between the two previous jobs. Of course, we also introduce a dummy 
variable which is equal to one when the worker is a woman and to zero otherwise. The results are in 
column (1) of Table 3. 
We find surprisingly a somewhat low value for the gender wage gap in Morocco. At the mean of the 
distribution, the residual wage gap is equal to 0.12 log points once controlling for observable 
characteristics. Such a value is rather similar to that of many developed country. Recalling that the 
overall wage gap was around 0.24 log points, this means that differences in labour market experience 
and education only account for a 0.12 log point difference between male and female employees. Two 
explanations may come to mind. The first one is that the rather modest educational gap probably plays 
a role. The second one is undoubtedly the design of the survey, as we only have data on formal 
establishments with at least 10 employees in the manufacturing sector. Informal workers and 
individuals with very low wages are not observed13. 
As we have matched employer-employee data, we can pick up the role of unobserved firm 
heterogeneity by including firm-specific dummies. We then estimate a fixed effects regression, whose 
results are in column 1 of Table 4. Several comments are in order. First, we still observe a negative 
and significant impact at the 1 percent level of the female dummy variable. Second, we find that 
inclusion of fixed effects has a limited impact on the magnitude of the gender wage gap. Indeed, the 
residual wage gap is equal to 13.6 percent, which is a little bit higher than the gap of 12 percent 
achieved with the standard OLS framework. Third, we assess the relevance of the fixed effect 
specification by comparing estimates from the random effects and the fixed effects models. We find a 
value of 34.65 for the Hausman statistics (with 11 degrees of freedom) that is significant at the 1 
percent level, meaning that it matters to account for firm specific effects. 
 
                                                     
13 The problem is then that the data are restricted to workers employed in industries of the manufacturing sector, but it is common to rely 
on such data given the difficulties in measuring earnings for other segments of the labour market. 
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Table 3: OLS and quantile regressions of the log monthly earnings 
 
Quantile regressions Variables OLS 
 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 
Constant 7.031*** 6.932*** 7.061*** 7.108*** 7.118*** 7.169*** 7.247*** 7.271*** 
 (235.01) (127.11) (190.17) (275.09) (263.94) (203.71) (117.41) (91.60) 
Dummy for being female -0.120*** -0.065*** -0.067*** -0.063*** -0.080*** -0.125*** -0.147*** -0.155*** 
 (10.67) (3.28) (4.96) (6.40) (7.84) (10.05) (6.87) (5.63) 
Number of children 0.005 -0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.008** 0.011** 0.017** 0.003 
 (1.16) (0.47) (0.65) (1.19) (2.17) (2.51) (2.36) (0.39) 
Years of completed schooling -0.030*** -0.012* -0.009** -0.016*** -0.031*** -0.037*** -0.043*** -0.030*** 
 (8.44) (1.78) (1.98) (5.12) (9.76) (8.95) (6.18) (3.33) 
(Years of completed schooling )2/100 0.578*** 0.219*** 0.201*** 0.302*** 0.513*** 0.699*** 0.884*** 0.878*** 
 (28.13) (5.40) (7.93) (16.97) (27.67) (29.38) (21.08) (16.43) 
Years of potential experience 0.031*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.028*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 
 (15.66) (2.78) (4.22) (11.16) (15.74) (14.81) (9.61) (8.17) 
(Years of potential experience)2 /100 -0.044*** -0.017** -0.015*** -0.031*** -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.043*** 
 (11.80) (2.56) (3.39) (10.08) (13.85) (11.30) (6.50) (4.72) 
Years of tenure in the current firm 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 
 (6.48) (5.46) (5.42) (5.16) (4.70) (4.23) (3.60) (3.88) 
(Years of tenure in the current firm)2/100 0.001 -0.024** -0.013 0.003 0.023*** 0.024** 0.019 -0.004 
 (0.14) (2.00) (1.46) (0.39) (3.07) (2.47) (1.20) (0.19) 
Number of preceding jobs 0.023*** 0.013 0.013** 0.017*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 
 (6.97) (1.59) (2.46) (5.38) (8.14) (7.88) (7.12) (4.93) 
Dummy for received formal training in the previous job 0.310*** 0.135** 0.117*** 0.142*** 0.392*** 0.418*** 0.314*** 0.364*** 
 (8.65) (2.22) (2.66) (4.57) (12.16) (10.52) (4.66) (4.20) 
Years of previous unemployment between the two previous jobs -0.038*** -0.053*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.043** -0.032 
 (5.01) (5.34) (3.96) (5.11) (4.02) (2.66) (2.03) (1.16) 
Number of observations 7786 7786 7786 7786 7786 7786 7786 7786 
Pseudo R² / R² 0.387 0.085 0.074 0.100 0.191 0.292 0.345 0.369 
Source: FACS Morocco 2000 
Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels are respectively 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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Table 4: Fixed effects, OLS and quantile regressions with firm factors of the log monthly earnings 
 
Quantile regressions Variables Fixed 
effects 
OLS 
0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 
Constant 7.021*** 7.075*** 6.963*** 7.103*** 7.147*** 7.128*** 7.219*** 7.343*** 7.382*** 
 (247.36) (245.12) (133.73) (216.69) (308.69) (303.22) (217.80) (136.05) (94.66) 
Dummy for being female -0.136*** -0.134*** -0.075*** -0.065*** -0.075*** -0.089*** -0.136*** -0.172*** -0.183*** 
 (12.76) (12.01) (4.01) (5.30) (8.34) (9.85) (11.12) (9.00) (6.46) 
Number of children 0.006* 0.005 -0.005 -0.003 0.004 0.007** 0.012*** 0.005 0.013 
 (1.81) (1.28) (0.80) (0.63) (1.21) (2.09) (2.94) (0.87) (1.48) 
Years of completed schooling -0.030*** -0.026*** -0.007 -0.005 -0.016*** -0.027*** -0.034*** -0.030*** -0.031*** 
 (8.68) (7.57) (1.03) (1.35) (5.64) (9.75) (8.62) (4.91) (3.42) 
(Years of completed schooling )2/100 0.564*** 0.524*** 0.167*** 0.161*** 0.289*** 0.479*** 0.633*** 0.728*** 0.807*** 
 (27.69) (26.26) (4.52) (7.08) (18.11) (29.46) (27.67) (20.46) (15.11) 
Years of potential experience 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 
 (16.95) (16.29) (3.83) (5.21) (12.08) (18.75) (15.98) (11.18) (7.91) 
(Years of potential experience)2 /100 -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.029*** -0.046*** -0.051*** -0.047*** -0.047*** 
 (12.24) (12.03) (3.27) (4.54) (10.47) (15.68) (12.48) (7.72) (5.12) 
Years of tenure in the current firm 0.024*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006 0.014*** 
 (9.16) (5.58) (3.77) (4.60) (4.36) (4.17) (3.30) (1.35) (2.75) 
(Years of tenure in the current firm)2/100 -0.029*** 0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.011* 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.037** 0.022 
 (3.43) (0.39) (0.28) (0.21) (1.72) (3.24) (2.89) (2.24) (1.29) 
Number of preceding jobs 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.011* 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 
 (3.43) (5.73) (1.65) (2.60) (6.00) (7.61) (7.54) (5.56) (4.60) 
Dummy for received formal training in the previous job 0.321*** 0.282*** 0.093 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.373*** 0.399*** 0.327*** 0.342*** 
 (9.91) (8.18) (1.61) (3.46) (4.63) (13.32) (10.60) (5.69) (4.04) 
Years of previous unemployment between the two 
previous jobs 
-0.030*** -0.039*** -0.059*** -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.041** -0.030** 
 (4.36) (5.37) (6.15) (3.13) (5.22) (4.51) (2.82) (2.54) (2.31) 
Number of observations 7786 7786 7786 7786 7786 7786 7786 7786 7786 
Pseudo R² / R² 0.383 0.436 0.129 0.117 0.139 0.223 0.322 0.374 0.392 
Source: FACS Morocco 2000 
Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels are respectively 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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In column 2 of Table 4, we estimate a linear model through OLS and add to the list of explanatory 
variables the set of firm factors obtained with the principal component analysis. The idea is that these 
firm factors should also control for heterogeneity at the firm level. Our findings suggest that this 
strategy is reliable, as our estimates with firm factors are very similar to those obtained with the fixed 
effects formulation. The mean gender wage gap evidenced with the augmented linear model is equal to 
13.4 percent instead of 13.6 percent with the fixed effects model, and still significant at the 1 percent 
level. In what follows, we then rely on the firm factors strategy to account for firm specific effects in 
the quantile regressions. 
4.2 Pooled quantile regressions 
We now estimate quantile regressions in order to know whether the magnitude of the gender earnings 
gap remains constant along the earnings distribution. Quantile regressions focus on specific parts of 
the conditional distribution of the dependent variable and provide estimates of the effect of gender, 
education or experience on log earnings at the bottom, at the median, and at the top of the log earnings 
distribution14. Let us briefly describe the underlying specification. We denote by ijw  the log earnings 
of individual i  working in firm j  and ijx  a vector of explanatory variables excluding gender. Let ijf  
be a dummy variable which is equal to one when the employee is a woman (zero otherwise). We 
estimate the following regression: 
)()(')( θγθβθ ijijijij fxxwq +=  (1) 
where )( ijij xwqθ  is the θ th conditional quantile of ijw . In a quantile regression, the distribution of the 
error term is left unspecified (Koenker and Bassett, 1978). The set of coefficients )(θβ  provides the 
estimated rates of return to the different covariates (gender being excluded) at the θ th quantile of the 
log earnings distribution, while the coefficient )(θγ  measures the intercept shift due to gender 
differences. 
When turning to the data, we begin by estimating the magnitude of the gender earnings gap on the 
whole sample, which includes both male and female employees. By pooling the data, we suppose that 
the returns to the labour market characteristics are the same at various quantiles for men and women. 
As this assumption does not necessarily hold, we will relax it latter on. With the pooled sample, the 
gender dummy in the quantile regressions may be interpreted as the effect of gender on log earnings at 
the various percentiles once one controls for any differences in observed labour market characteristics 
between genders. We first estimate the regressions with individual characteristics and neglect the 
potential role of firm heterogeneity. The corresponding estimates are in Table 3. 
Let us focus on the gender dummy variable. Recalling that the mean wage gap is about 12 percent, we 
find that the gender wag gap is much lower at the bottom of the earnings distribution. Conditional on 
the set of explanatory variables, we find that the gap goes from about 6.5 percent at the bottom of the 
earnings distribution to about 15 percent at the top of this distribution (95th percentile). Interestingly, it 
is equal to 8 percent at the 50th percentile and the mean estimated gap is nearly similar to the gap 
estimated at the 3rd quartile. Clearly, this increasing profile points to the existence of a glass ceiling 
effect which in Morocco works against women receiving higher wages. 
We have also performed the same quantile regressions with inclusion of the firm factors. Indeed, it 
may be that the gender wage gap arises as a result of the sorting of workers across firms that pay 
different wages. If this is true, one would expect the coefficient on the gender dummy to be much 
lower (and virtually non-existent) once firm factor effects are controlled for. As shown in Table 4, 
                                                     
14 The quantile regression method provides robust estimates, particularly for misspecification errors related to non-normality and 
heteroskedasticity (see Koenker and Bassett, 1978, Buchinsky, 1998). 
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estimates with firm factors lead to a slight increase in the value of the gender dummy coefficient. 
However, the gender gap widens in the upper tail of the conditional earnings distribution. For instance, 
the gender gap with firm factors at the median of the sample is equal to 8.9 percent instead of 8 
percent with no firm factors, but the difference between both values is much larger at the 95th 
percentile of the earnings distribution. The gender coefficient is equal to 18.3 percent with firm factors 
instead of 15.5 percent with no firm factors. Hence, controlling for firm specific effects matters when 
estimating the magnitude of the glass ceiling phenomenon15. 
Two additional comments are in order. First, with respect to the unadjusted gender gap described in 
Figure 1, these estimates show that part of the earnings gap stems from gender differences in observed 
characteristics. Second, albeit the differences along the earnings distribution remain rather small 
compared to those found for other countries (in particularly Sweden), it matters to stress that the 
differences across quantiles remain significant. In Figure 2, we plot the values for the gender wage gap 
once controlling for observable characteristics and firm factors and add the associated confidence 
intervals. We observe that the confidence intervals respectively at the bottom and at the top of the 
distribution are disjoint16. 
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Source: FACS Morocco 2000 
So far, we did not account for occupation status in the various earnings regressions. It could be argued 
that the female dummy variable partially picks up these occupational effects, thereby leading to an 
over-estimated gender effect. A problem is that occupational assignment may be itself an outcome of 
employer practices rather than an outcome of differences in productivity or individual choice 
(Albrecht et alii, 2003)17. We thus reestimate the various quantile regressions and include four 
dummies for occupational status. The results, not reported, indicate that the magnitude of the gender 
wage gap is reduced at the upper part of the distribution. 
Without firm factors, the median wage gap is now equal to 6.3 percent instead of 8 percent. The 
difference between both measures is still around 2 points of percentage at the 75th percentile 
(12.6 percent instead of 14.7 percent), while it is much higher at the 95th percentile (10 percent instead 
                                                     
15 Earnings equations with firm factors have also a better fit than the standard Mincerian earnings functions. 
16 The same result holds when the different quantile regressions do not include the set of firm factors. 
17 This would occur for instance if employers differentiate between men and women through their tendency to hire into certain 
occupations. 
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of 15.5 percent). Results are very similar once we account for firm heterogeneity18. However, in both 
case (either with or without firm factors), we still observe an increasing gender earnings gap along the 
earnings distribution. With firm factors, the gap goes from 6.4 percent at the 1st quartile to 7.9 percent 
at the 3rd quartile, the maximum gap of 12.4 percent being reached at the 95th percentile. The data 
confirm the presence of a glass ceiling effect in Moroccan manufacturing firms, albeit it seems 
difficult to know whether differences in occupations are related to a form of gender discrimination. 
4.3 Gender-differentiated returns to individual characteristics 
Under the assumption that the returns to individual characteristics are the same at various quantiles for 
men and women, we find a convex profile for years of education as evidenced by Söderbom et alii 
(2004) in Kenyan and Tanzanian manufacturing firms. The returns to each additional year of 
education are much higher in the upper part of the earnings distribution, especially above the 3rd 
quartile. A concave profile is found for potential experience, the marginal benefit of each additional 
year of experience being larger for higher levels of conditional earnings. This is consistent with 
findings from Portugal, where all aspects of human capital are more valued specifically for high 
paying jobs (Machado and Mata, 2001). While the impact of tenure in the current firm does not really 
vary along the earnings distribution, earnings increase with the number of preceding jobs, especially in 
the upper part of the distribution and are also higher when the worker has received formal training in 
the previous job. 
A difficulty however is that the pooling assumption does not really seem realistic. In Morocco, the 
objective of an equal treatment of men and women in the labour market is far from being achieved. 
We test the relevance of this assumption by adding into the previous earnings functions the same 
covariates crossed with the gender dummy. If the coefficients associated with the crossed variables are 
significantly different from zero, then the assumption of equal returns to individual characteristics for 
male and female employees has to be rejected. When computing Wald tests to assess the joint 
significativeness of the crossed variables, the hypothesis of joint nullity is rejected at the 1 percent 
level for the various quantile regressions19. 
We then estimate specific earnings regressions respectively for men and for women. We rely on 
quantile regressions and include firm factors in order to pick up unobserved heterogeneity at the firm 
level. These gender-specific regressions are reported in Table 5. We note that the returns to education 
are slightly higher for men than for women, and this occurs throughout the whole earnings 
distribution. Each additional year of experience in the current firm has a much higher return for men 
than for women. For females, a rise in the number of previous jobs before the current one increases by 
about 3 percent the level of income, at least till the 50th percentile. Finally, the rewards of formal 
training are higher for men in the lower part of the conditional income distribution, but slightly higher 
for women above the 90th percentile. 
                                                     
18 For instance, at the 95th percentile, the gender wage gap is equal to 18.3 percent with no control for occupation and about 12.4 percent 
with inclusion of dummies for occupations. 
19 At the median value of the earnings distribution, gender differences in the returns to observable characteristics mainly stem from 
education and formal training in the previous job. In the lower part of the distribution, differences between men and women are mainly 
linked to education, tenure in the current firm and number of preceding jobs. 
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Table 5: Gender-specific quantile and OLS regressions with firm factors of the log monthly earnings 
 
Quantile regressions 
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Fixed effects Variables 
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Constant 7.000*** 7.119*** 7.022*** 7.234*** 6.986*** 7.252*** 7.005*** 7.278*** 7.200*** 7.340*** 6.921*** 7.059*** 
 (163.43) (184.82) (216.70) (258.70) (183.72) (242.65) (112.64) (219.19) (77.48) (110.24) (169.64) (183.19) 
Number of children -0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.016*** -0.007 0.030*** 0.001 0.031*** -0.003 0.033*** -0.001 0.028*** 
 (0.23) (0.19) (1.13) (2.84) (1.59) (5.32) (0.08) (5.32) (0.29) (3.20) (0.21) (4.29) 


















 (2.60) (1.32) (4.75) (2.01) (6.42) (3.77) (3.28) (6.17) (2.56) (3.01) (6.36) (4.08) 
(Years of completed schooling )2/100 0.263*** 0.049* 0.368*** 0.149*** 0.563*** 0.282*** 0.667*** 0.469*** 0.771*** 0.615*** 0.622*** 0.419*** 
 (7.91) (1.76) (15.53) (6.88) (22.01) (11.64) (16.82) (17.35) (13.35) (11.34) (21.61) (13.21) 
Years of potential experience 0.018*** 0.001 0.024*** 0.010*** 0.033*** 0.024*** 0.039*** 0.027*** 0.035*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 
 (6.25) (0.36) (11.00) (4.93) (12.66) (10.30) (9.55) (11.05) (5.76) (6.19) (11.53) (10.04) 






















 (5.11) (0.38) (8.65) (5.48) (9.22) (10.15) (6.68) (9.72) (3.07) (4.34) (7.78) (8.30) 
Years of tenure in the current firm 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.016*** -0.002 0.016*** 0.005* 0.025*** 0.002 0.032*** 0.009** 
 (4.10) (5.14) (4.52) (3.71) (5.37) (0.89) (3.75) (1.68) (4.00) (0.30) (9.02) (2.37) 
(Years of tenure in the current firm)2/100 -0.006 -0.011 0.001 0.002 -0.007 0.062*** -0.006 0.047*** -0.036* 0.062*** -
0.059*** 
0.033** 
 (0.58) (1.04) (0.08) (0.17) (0.69) (6.44) (0.38) (4.29) (1.70) (3.30) (5.16) (2.34) 
Number of preceding jobs 0.001 0.039*** 0.008** 0.029*** 0.013*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 
 (0.28) (5.89) (2.17) (6.94) (3.39) (5.29) (4.08) (6.08) (3.92) (3.97) (2.74) (2.78) 
Dummy for received formal training in the previous job 0.116** 0.115** 0.179*** 0.046 0.352*** 0.128*** 0.342*** 0.297*** 0.272*** 0.188** 0.364*** 0.246*** 
 (2.42) (2.19) (4.89) (1.12) (8.51) (2.82) (5.44) (6.11) (2.95) (2.35) (8.36) (4.34) 





















 (1.99) (3.25) (4.56) (5.37) (2.92) (3.64) (2.93) (2.65) (1.82) (2.85) (37.97) (25.90) 
Number of observations 4675 3111 4675 3111 4675 3111 4675 3111 4675 3111 4675 3111 
Pseudo R² / R² 0.122 0.122 0.159 0.115 0.255 0.158 0.327 0.275 0.378 0.334 0.398 0.286 
Source: FACS Morocco 2000 
Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels are respectively 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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5 ADDITIONAL FINDINGS 
5.1 Insights from decomposition analyses 
We turn to a decomposition analysis of the gender pay gap. We seek to decompose the difference 
between the male and female log earnings distributions into two components. The first one is due to 
differences in labour market characteristics between male and female employees. The second is related 
to differences in the returns that men and women receive for their observable characteristics. We 
proceed in the following way. 
First, we implement the classical Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, whose aim is to identify the sources 
of differences between the means of the male and female distribution (Oaxaca and Ramson, 1994). 
Formally, let us denote by mβ  and fβ  the men and women’s returns to labour market characteristics, 
respectively mx  and fx . The decomposition of the difference between the male and female earnings 
densities may be expressed as: 
ffmfmmffmm xxxxx βββββ )()( −+−=−  (2) 
meaning that the counterfactual distribution is defined as the one that would arise if women were 
endowed on the basis of men’s labour market characteristics and were paid like women20. In (2), the 
first term on the right hand side indicates the magnitude of the gap at the mean of the sample which is 
due to differences in the rewards to these characteristics. The second term indicates the magnitude of 
the mean gap which is due to dissimilarities in labour market characteristics.  
Following the technique recently discussed in Machado and Mata (2005), we have also implemented 
the above decomposition at each quantile of the earnings distribution. The decomposition of the 
difference between the male and female earnings densities is now: 
)()())()(()()( θβθβθβθβθβ ffmfmmffmm xxxxx −+−=−  (3) 
with )(θβ m  and )(θβ f  the returns to the different covariates at the θ th quantile of the log earnings 
distribution. To construct the counterfactual density, we rely on the three following steps. First, we 
draw a random sample of 150 numbers from a standard uniform distribution. Then, using these 
different numbers denoted by jθ , with 150 ,...,1=j , we estimate the quantile regressions coefficient 
vectors )( j
f θβ  for the various j  using the female subsample. Finally, we take a draw j  times with 
replacement from the male subsample and generate the predicted earnings )( j
fmx θβ . This 
counterfactual female log wage density indicates what men would have earned if they were paid like 
women21.  
Let us first discuss the decomposition at the mean. As shown in Table 6, the gender gap is equal to 
24.4 percent at the mean of the sample. Around one half of the gap is due to differences between men 
and women in the characteristics introduced into the regressions (13.3 percent). The other half 
(11.1 percent) stems from gender differences in the rewards to these covariates. Another finding is that 
accounting for firm factors has little impact on the mean decomposition. The gender gap is virtually 
the same and we observe only a very small decrease in the weight of the component due to differences 
in observable characteristics. 
                                                     
20 Note that a second counterfactual density may be constructed. It would be the density that would arise if men were endowed on the basis 
of women’s labour market characteristics, but were paid like men. 
21 In order to get standard errors for the different terms of the quantile decomposition, we replicate the whole procedure exactly 50 times. 
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Table 6: Mean and quantile decompositions of the gender earnings gap 
 
Difference in characteristics Difference in coefficients Total difference Type of decomposition 
No firm factors With firm factors No firm factors With firm factors No firm factors With firm factors 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition       
Mean 0.1333 0.1288 0.1108 0.1153 0.2441 0.2441 
 (0.0100) (0.0108) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0124) (0.0124) 
Machado-Mata decomposition       
0.0556 0.0502 0.0692 0.0734 0.1248 0.1237 
Percentile 10 
(0.0038) (0.0052) (0.0072) (0.0039) (0.0048) (0.0076) 
0.0583 0.0622 0.0996 0.0994 0.1580 0.1617 
Percentile 25 
(0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0088) (0.0071) (0.0108) (0.0082) 
0.0945 0.1032 0.1370 0.1318 0.2316 0.2351 
Percentile 50 
(0.0055) (0.0108) (0.0086) (0.0036) (0.0124) (0.0090) 
0.1475 0.1372 0.1888 0.1900 0.3364 0.3273 
Percentile 75 
(0.0096) (0.0070) (0.0094) (0.0166) (0.0145) (0.0182) 
0.2191 0.1825 0.1689 0.1978 0.3881 0.3803 
Percentile 90 
(0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0181) (0.0132) (0.0079) (0.0099) 
Source: FACS Morocco 2000. 
Note: For the quantile decomposition, standard errors in parentheses are obtained with 50 replications of the decomposition. 
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We now consider the quantile decomposition performed respectively at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
percentiles of the distribution. Using women’s returns and assuming that these females have the male 
distribution of labour market characteristics, the counterfactual gender earnings gap is much lower 
than the observed pay gap. At the median of the distribution, the total gender gap is around 
23.2 percent. This gap depends more heavily on differences in coefficients (13.7 percent) than in 
differences in characteristics (9.5 percent). While the weight of both components is almost identical in 
the lower part of the distribution, we observe conversely that differences in characteristics are 
relatively more important in the upper part of the earnings distribution. 
The fact that gender differences in individual characteristics explain the larger gap observed at the top 
of the distribution is at odd with empirical findings in developed countries. For instance, in Sweden, 
the gender pay gap mainly stems from differences in the rewards of individual variables (Albrecht et 
alii, 2003). Another finding is that introducing the firm factors in the decomposition increases the 
weight of the component measuring differences in coefficients at the top of the distribution (90th 
percentile). Conversely, it has little effect at the bottom of the distribution. Within firms where women 
and men have identical labour market characteristics, females are less rewarded for their observed 
endowments than males when they reach top positions. 
5.2 Wage growth and the gender gap 
All the previous regressions that show an increasing gender wage gap along the earnings distribution 
are based on the earnings level in 1999. Since the data also include information on the level of 
earnings in 1998, we now investigate the impact of gender on the log wage growth. Although we have 
a one year period, the focus on the log wage growth allows us to control for individual heterogeneity. 
Suppose that there exists an unobserved worker fixed effect iφ , constant over time. We can express 
the earnings levels for the two periods as 
98989898 ' ijiijij xw εφβ ++=  and 99999999 ' ijiijij xw εφβ ++= . 
Then, relying on a first-difference approach, we get: 
9899989899999899 '' ijijijijijij xxww εεββ −+−=−  (4) 
so that the individual fixed component is removed. A difficulty with the difference approach in this 
context is that many covariates introduced into the earnings equation are fixed over time, so that they 
can no longer be included as covariates. Another problem stems from the fact that for many workers, 
there is absolutely no change in earnings between 1998 and 1999. A quantile regression method would 
clearly not make sense in this context.  
We estimate instead linear regression models by gender as in Manning and Swaffield (2005). The idea 
is to compare the predicted wage growth by gender, depending on a set of covariates. However, unlike 
these authors who only focus on the mean of the log wage growth, we also wonder whether there exist 
any gender differences in the earnings growth depending on the workers’ relative position across the 
earnings distribution. For that purpose, we choose to perform our estimations conditional on the initial 
position in the distribution. Specifically, we compute the predicted log earnings growth for four 
subsamples, which are given by the belonging to the various quartiles of earnings in 199822. 
We first calculate the means of the log earnings growth for men and women, with no explanatory 
variables. As shown in Table 7, there exist some slight differences by gender. Among those who were 
in the lowest quartile in 1998, the mean rise in income is about 1 point of percentage higher for 
women. A different pattern is found for the three remaining quartiles since the wage growth is more 
important for men, albeit the differences are not significant (about 0.30 percentage point). Then, we 
introduce potential experience alone in a quadratic form in the regressions. For the lowest quartile, we 
                                                     
22 Note that we loose 8 percent and 11 percent of the sub-samples of men and women respectively due to missing data on the level of 
earnings in 1998. Except a lower average years of tenure in the current firm (1.3 instead of 8 years), these individuals have no other 
noticeable differentiated human capital characteristics as compared to the individuals for whom earnings in 1998 are available. 
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still find a higher growth for women, but the magnitude of the growth gap is now reduced. Conversely, 
for the third and fourth quartiles of incomes, we obtain a much higher positive value for the gender 
difference in wage growth. 
Table 7: Predicted earnings growth and gender effect 
 
Quartile of earnings in 1998 Dependent variable :  
Log earnings 1999 – Log earnings 1998 1 2 3 4 Mean value
(1) No control variables      
Men (n=4302) 4.31 2.43 3.52 2.59 3.17 
Women (n=2759) 5.27 2.23 3.13 2.23 3.47 
Difference -0.96 0.20 0.39 0.36 -0.30 
(2) Control variables: potential experience, potential experience squared 
Men 4.53 2.53 4.00 2.70 3.38 
Women 4.76 2.36 2.66 1.96 3.23 
Difference -0.23 0.17 1.34 0.74 0.15 
(3) Control variables: same as (2) + number of children, years of schooling, tenure in the current firm, number 
of preceding jobs, formal training in the previous job, years of previous unemployment between the two 
previous jobs 
Men 4.81 3.07 4.11 3.03 3.41 
Women 5.55 2.81 3.05 0.93 3.38 
Difference -0.74 0.26 1.06 2.1 0.03 
(4) Control variables: same as (3) + occupational status 
Men 5.69 3.63 4.18 2.86 3.40 
Women 6.86 3.30 3.01 0.76 3.37 
Difference -1.17 0.33 1.17 2.1 0.03 
Source: FACS Morocco 2000. 
This suggests that the glass ceiling effect may be stronger at older ages in manufacturing firms in 
Morocco, as high wage men benefit from higher increase in earnings than women. However, a focus 
on mean values for wage growth would lead to misleading conclusions, since a comparison of the 
male and female mean wage growth leads to an insignificant gap of 0.03 percent. Finally, we estimate 
two additional models with more control variables and get the following results. First, we get more 
acute gender differences. In the lowest quartile, women benefit from more generous increase in 
income, while the mean growth is about 2 percent higher for men in the highest quartile. Second, 
differences in log earnings growth are not really affected by the inclusion of occupation status, the 
male excess gap ranging from -1.2 percent for the first quartile till +2.1 percent for the upper one. 
5.3 The within-firm gender earnings gap 
We finally investigate the factors that influence firms to pay different premia for men and women. We 
restrict our attention to the mean of the earnings distribution and focus on the difference between the 
















ij xw εφβ ++= '  (6) 
Both fixed effect models are estimated on the sample of firms which have at least two male and two 
female observations23. These regressions are estimated on 2,999 male workers and 2,487 female 
workers and we retrieve for a given firm the fixed effects respectively for men and women. A F-test 
                                                     
23 This reduces by less than one third our initial sample of firms. For comparisons, summary statistics of the firms’ characteristics for the 
restricted and unrestricted samples of firms are reported in Table 1. Let us note that the sample restriction hardly changed anything with 
regard to the sectoral distribution and other firm characteristics. As a matter of fact, the only noticeable changes between the two 
samples are quite expected and concern the share of female employees and the proportion of garment firms in the sample (which are 
highly female intensive in Morocco). 
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indicates that the two sets of fixed effects 
m
jφˆ  and fjφˆ  are significantly different. Then, we follow 




j φφ ˆˆ −  that may be seen as an estimate of the within-firm 
gender earnings gap. 
Table 8: Effects of firm characteristics on the within-firm gender earnings gap 
 
Control for the effect of 
occupation on earnings 
No control for the effect of 
occupation on earnings 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sectoral dummies (Ref: Garment firms) Food  0.025 -0.008 -0.008 -0.039 
 (0.63) (0.16) (0.18) (0.69) 
Textile 0.065** 0.067* 0.039 0.038 
 (2.04) (1.77) (1.07) (0.85) 
Leather 0.030 0.034 -0.005 0.009 
 (0.76) (0.66) (0.11) (0.17) 
Electrical 0.190*** 0.190** 0.131* 0.122 
 (2.72) (2.56) (1.66) (1.42) 
Chemicals -0.049 -0.079 -0.092 -0.131* 
 (0.98) (1.35) (1.61) (1.85) 
Plastics 0.019 0.020 -0.031 -0.038 
 (0.35) (0.30) (0.47) (0.46) 
Primarily exporting firms -0.029 -0.013 -0.040 -0.025 
 (0.99) (0.36) (1.19) (0.57) 
Number of local competitors for the principal product 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.26) (0.29) (0.94) (0.96) 
Market share 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001 
 (1.28) (1.83) (1.06) (1.10) 
Share of female employees 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.93) (1.20) (0.45) (0.33) 
0.045*** 0.040** 0.020 0.013 Firm size  
(1: <50 employees, 2: 50<employees<150, 3: employees>150) (2.63) (2.01) (1.07) (0.56) 
Are the employees unionised? (1 if yes) 0.017 0.047 -0.023 0.018 
 (0.33) (0.85) (0.31) (0.20) 
Share of unionised employees -0.073 -0.072 -0.049 -0.069 
 (1.18) (1.27) (0.55) (0.72) 
Qualified employees being dominant occupation (1 if yes) -0.027 -0.037 -0.013 -0.037 
 (1.06) (1.24) (0.46) (1.09) 
-0.069 -0.077 -0.143*** -0.174** Share of managers higher than 10% of the total employees  
(1 if yes) (1.59) (1.42) (2.83) (2.57) 
0.066 0.084 0.094* 0.112* Highly labour intensive firms in 1998  
(1 if labour costs > 75% total costs) (1.44) (1.46) (1.80) (1.75) 
Firms with more than 75% foreign owned (1 if yes) 0.172** 0.152** 0.155* 0.137 
 (2.28) (2.00) (1.86) (1.65) 
Profitable firms (1 if yes) -0.032 -0.019 -0.026 -0.033 
 (1.21) (0.62) (0.90) (0.95) 
Share of days lost due to absenteeism  -0.779*  -0.904** 
  (1.88)  (2.17) 
Share of days lost due to strike i  1.269*  1.151* 
  (1.93)  (1.92) 
Share of sales lost due to theft i  9.004***  9.676*** 
  (3.39)  (3.87) 
Share of executives promoted in 1999  0.833**  0.774 
  (2.39)  (1.43) 
Number of on-the-job day-trainees in 1999  -0.000  -0.000 
  (1.17)  (0.11) 
Constant -0.104** -0.114* -0.020 0.004 
 (2.40) (1.93) (0.42) (0.05) 
Observations 442 338 442 338 
R-squared 0.0950 0.1529 0.0781 0.1281 
The dependent variable is the difference in fixed effects fj
m
j φφ ˆˆ −  in 1999. Robust t statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * mean 
respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
(i) Because of the large number of missing values for these firm variables (about 20% of the firm sample), we use the modified zero-order 
regression method described in Maddala (1977). Observations with missing information are set to zero and we include in the regression a 
dummy variable for the missing observations. 
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To explain this within-firm, we introduce explanatory variables related to observable firm 
characteristics. The difference in fixed effects is estimated using simple OLS regressions, and the 
corresponding estimates are shown in Table 8. We perform two sets of estimates, as we present the 
determinants of the within-firm gender earnings gap obtained alternatively with and without dummies 
for individual occupation in the first step earnings regressions24. Explaining the within-firm gender 
earnings gap is quite difficult, as the R² is around 10 percent. Meng and Meurs (2004) find that less 
than 4 percent of the variation of this within-firm gender gap is explained by observable firm 
characteristics in France and about 7 percent in Australia. 
A few sectoral dummies are statistically significant in the regressions, at least with controls for the 
effect of occupation on earnings. Compared to garment companies, the within-firm gender gap is 
significantly higher in the electrical and textile sectors. Also, the firm gender pay gap is an increasing 
function of the firm size, which may be due to more opportunities for large firms to discriminate 
between their male and female workers. Moreover, the data indicate that firms which are mainly 
foreign-owned operate with more discrimination with respect to female workers than other firms. 
These results may be explained by the fact that, under strong product market competition, firms may 
not be able to afford to discriminate and will therefore try to reduce the level of discrimination (Arrow, 
1973). By contrast, firms with more market power, such as foreign-owned or large firms in our case, 
may be more likely to discriminate against women (Hellerstein et alii, 2002)25. 
Another argument that explains why some firms may be more likely to discriminate than others 
concerns the availability of information on workers’ productivity. The dummy for a high share of 
managers in the firms exerts a negative impact on the within-firm gender gap. This can be explained 
by the fact that firms with high supervision rates have a priori more information on workers’ 
productivity. Observing individual productivity may reduce uncertainty and therefore the tendency to 
discriminate. In the same vein, highly labour intensive firms, where productivity can less easily be 
observed, discriminate more than other firms. Moreover, the share of days lost due to strike and the 
share of sales lost due to theft have significant and positive effects on the size of the within-firm 
gender pay gap. This may also reveal that discrimination practices arise in firms where there is greater 
uncertainty on workers’ behaviour26. 
Finally, another interesting result concerns the firms’ promotion policy. Firms with a high share of 
promoted executives the last year considered are characterised by higher within-firm gender gap. This 
may be a sign that promotion is essentially reserved to males in this type of firms. These gender-
differentiated promotions are one of the sources of the glass ceiling effect and are fully consistent with 
our previous results on wage growth. 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we investigate the relevance of the glass ceiling hypothesis in Morocco, according to 
which in developed countries, there exist larger gender wage gaps at the upper tail of the wage 
distribution. Using a matched worker-firm data set of more than 8,000 employees and 850 employers, 
we estimate quantile regressions and perform counterfactual gender earnings gap decompositions at 
different quantiles while taking account of firms’ effects on earnings differentials. We then propose 
estimates of the within-firm earnings growth by gender as well as estimates of the determinants of the 
within-firm gender earnings gap using our information on the firms’ characteristics. 
Our estimates lead to the following results. As in many developed countries, there exists a glass 
ceiling effect in manufacturing firms of Morocco, the earnings gap being much higher at the top of the 
                                                     
24 Again, it is debatable whether job characteristics or occupation should be taken into account. If employers differentiate between men and 
women through their to hire into certain occupations, then occupational assignment is an outcome of employer practices rather than an 
outcome of individual choice or productivity differences (Altonji and Blank, 1999). Conversely, it could be argued that analyses 
omitting occupation may underestimate the importance of background and choice-based characteristics on labour market outcomes. 
25 Note that the variable indicating the firm’s market share is significant in column 2 only (at the 10 percent level), but exerts a positive 
effect on the within-firm gender gap indeed. 
26 However, let us note that the share of days lost due to absenteeism plays significantly in opposite sense, which recommends us to 
interpret these proxies of uncertainty with some cautious. 
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distribution than at the bottom. According to the results of the counterfactual density without firm 
heterogeneity controls, gender differences in labour market characteristics mostly explain the larger 
gap observed at the top of the distribution. This result is at odd with empirical findings in developed 
countries, in particular those in Sweden by Albrecht et alii (2003), where the bulk of the gender pay 
gap is mainly due to differences in the returns to individual characteristics (especially in the upper part 
of the distribution). 
The previous authors having evidenced the presence of the glass ceiling phenomenon did not make use 
of matched worker-firm data. Moreover, our study is the first one of this kind being applied on a 
developing country. Our findings suggest that it matters to account for firms’ characteristics. Indeed, 
controlling for firm-specific effects increases the value and significance of the gender dummy 
coefficient along the earnings distribution. Not only the gender gap is not reduced when capturing the 
firm effects on earnings differentials, but it widens significantly in the upper tail of the earnings 
distribution, thereby reinforcing the presence of the glass ceiling phenomenon.  
Then, the results of the counterfactual decompositions with firm effects emphasise that, within firms 
where women and men have identical labour market characteristics, females are less rewarded for 
their observed endowments than males are and this is all the more true when they reach top positions. 
Hence, empirical results on the log gender pay gap which would not control for the firm effects may 
understate the earnings differences between men and women. In that sense, our results evidenced for a 
developing country like Morocco are different from those observed in European countries where the 
gender wage gap is often observed to be overstated when controls for firm heterogeneity are missing.  
Our study also goes one step further by comparing the wage growth by gender along the earnings 
distribution. Our results suggest that the glass ceiling effect might be reinforced over time in Morocco, 
as high wage male workers benefit from higher increase in earnings than women do. Finally, thanks to 
the rich firm-level information, we are able to disentangle the various forces at work in the formation 
of the within-firm gender earnings gap. Among other results, we find that observing individual 
productivity and getting information on workers is likely to reduce employers’ uncertainty, which in 
turn leaves fewer places to gender earnings discrimination.  
From a policy viewpoint, the next step is to understand the causes of the glass ceiling. If the gender 
pay gap is linked to the work environment faced by women, this implies that all the policies which 
may influence the interaction between work and family matters. For instance, policies providing 
strong incentive to participate in the labour force for women, like financial benefits after birth or 
subsidized access to day care, may discourage a strong career commitment from parents. This would 
be taken into account by employers, who would expect a much lower career commitment from female 
employees. At the same time, it may be very difficult for career oriented women with low or medium 
wage to hire household help or to pay for formal child care, leading to a lower involvement in their 
jobs. 
In developing countries, the glass ceiling effect is more likely to depend on the different educational 
choices of men and women since family policies are often inexistent there or insufficiently 
implemented. In Morocco for instance, managers in manufacturing firms are most often recruited from 
a limited number of educational backgrounds, in particular technical fields such as engineering or 
business administration. The difficulty is that women most often lack strong presence in these fields. 
Promoting access to such educational paths for women, with for instance a minimal number of girls 
into such educational establishments, could in turn help dismantle part of the glass ceiling effect. 
 26 
REFERENCES 
Althabe G. (1978), « Strikes, Urban Mass Action and Political Change: Tananarive 1972 », in P.C.W. 
Gutkind, R. Cohen and J. Copans (eds.), African Labor History, Sage Publications, London, 
pp. 205-243. 
Abowd J.M., Kramarz F. (1999), “The analysis of labor markets using matched employer-employee 
data”, in Ashenfelter O. and Card D. (eds), Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3B, Elsevier, 
North-Holland, pp. 2629-2710. 
Agenor P.-R., El Aynaoui K. (2003), “Labor market policies and unemployment in Morocco”, World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3091, Washington: The World Bank. 
Albrecht J., Björklund A., Vroman S. (2003), “Is there a glass ceiling in Sweden?”, Journal of Labor 
Economics, vol. 21, pp. 145-177. 
Albrecht J., van Vuuren A., Vroman S. (2006), “Counterfactual distributions with sample selection 
adjustments: Econometric theory and an application to the Netherlands”, mimeo, University of 
Georgetown. 
Altonji J.G., Blank R.M. (1999), “Race and gender in the labor market”, in Ashenfelter O.C. and Card 
D. (eds), Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3C, Elsevier, chapter 48, pp. 3143-3258. 
Arrow K.J. (1973), “The theory of discrimination”, in Ashenfelter O.C. and Rees A. (eds), 
Discrimination in Labour Markets, Princeton Uni. Press, Princeton, NJ, pp. 3-33. 
Arulampalam W., Booth A.L., Bryan M.L. (2004), “Is there a glass ceiling over Europe? Exploring 
the gender pay gap across the wages distribution”, IZA Discussion Paper, n° 1373. 
Appleton S., Hoddinott J., Krishnan P. (1999), “The gender wage gap in three African countries”, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 47, n°2, pp. 289-312.  
Benhayoun G., Bazen S., Lazzeri Y., Moustier E., Guillaumet P. (2001), “Le salaire minimum au 
Maroc”, unpublished, Ministère de l’Emploi, de la Formation Professionnelle, du Développement 
Social et de la Solidarité, July. 
Bonjour D., Gerfin M. (2001), “The unequal distribution of unequal pay. An empirical analysis of the 
gender wage gap in Switzerland”, Empirical Economics, vol. 26, pp. 407-427. 
Buchinsky M. (1998), “Recent advances in quantile regression models: A practical guideline for 
empirical research”, The Journal of Human Resources, vol. 33, n°1, pp. 88-126. 
Clerides S.K., Lach S., Tybout J.R. (1998), “Is learning by exporting important? Micro-dynamic 
evidence from Columbia, Mexico, and Morocco”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(3), 
pp. 903-947. 
Cling J.-P., Razafindrakoto M., Roubaud F. (2003), New International Poverty Reduction Strategies, 
London/New York: Routledge. 
Datta Gupta N., Oaxaca R.L., Smith N. (2006), “Swimming upstream, floating downstream: 
Comparing women’s relative wage positions in the US and Denmark”, Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, vol. 59, n° 2, pp. 243-266. 
De la Rica S., Dolado J.J., Llorens S. (2005), “Ceiling and floors: Gender wage gaps by education in 
Spain”, IZA Discussion Paper, n° 1483. 
 27 
Del Rio C., Gradin C., Canto O. (2005), “The measurement of gender wage discrimination: The 
distributional approach revisited’, Mimeographed, Universidad de Vigo. 
Fitzenberger B., Wunderlich G. (2002), “Gender wage differences in West Germany: A cohort 
analysis”, German Economic Review, vol. 3, pp. 379-414. 
Fafchamps M., Söderbom M., Benhassine N. (2006), “Job sorting in African labor markets”, 
Mimeographed, University of Oxford, January.  
Gardeazabal J., Ugidos A. (2005), “Gender wage discrimination at quantiles”, Journal of Population 
Economics, vol. 18, pp. 165-179.  
Hellerstein J., Neumark D., Troske K. (2002), “Market forces and sex discrimination”, Journal of 
Human Resources, vol. 37(2), pp. 353-380. 
Koenker R., Bassett G. (1978), “Regression quantiles”, Econometrica, vol. 46, pp. 33-50. 
Kuepie M., Nordman C., Roubaud F. (2006), “Education and labour market outcomes in Sub-Saharan 
West Africa”, DIAL Working Paper, DT/2006/16, DIAL, Paris. 
Jellal M., Nordman C., Wolff F.C. (2007), “Evidence on the glass ceiling in France using matched 
worker-firm data”, Applied Economics, forthcoming. 
Lane J., Hakim G., Miranda J. (1999), “Labor market analysis and public policy: the case of 
Morocco”, The World Bank Economic Review, vol. 13(3), pp. 561-578.  
Machado J.A., Mata J. (2001), “Earning functions in Portugal 1982-1984: Evidence from quantile 
regressions”, Empirical Economics, vol. 26, pp. 115-134. 
Machado J.A., Mata J. (2005), “Counterfactual decomposition of changes in wage distributions using 
quantile regression”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol. 20(4), pp. 445-465. 
Maddala G.S. (1977), Econometrics, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Mairesse J., Greenan N. (1999), “Using employee level data in a firm level econometric Study”, 
NBER Working Paper, #7028. 
Manning A., Swaffield J. (2005), “The gender gap in early-career wage growth”, Centre for Economic 
Performance (CEP) Discussion Paper, n°70, London. 
Meng X., (2004), “Gender earnings gap: the role of firm specific effects”, Labour Economics, vol. 11, 
pp. 555-573. 
Meng X., Meurs D. (2004), “The gender earnings gap: Effects of institutions and firms. A comparative 
study of French and Australian private firms”, Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 56, pp. 189-208. 
Montenegro C. (2001), “Wage distribution in Chile: Does gender matter? A quantile regression 
approach”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 20, Washington: The World Bank. 
Muller C., Nordman C. (2004), “Which human capital matters for rich and poor’s wages? Evidence 
from matched worker-firm data from Tunisia”, DIAL Working Paper, DT/2004/09, DIAL, Paris. 
CREDIT Research Paper, 04/08, University of Nottingham. 
Mwabu G., Schultz T. P. (1996), “Education returns across quantiles of the wage function”, American 
Economic Review, vol. 86, pp. 335-39. 
 28 
Nordman C., Roubaud F. (2005), “Reassessing the gender wage gap: Does labour force attachment 
really matter? Evidence from matched labour force and biographical surveys in Madagascar”, 
DIAL Working Paper, DT/2005/06, Paris. 
Oaxaca R., Ramson M. (1994), “On discrimination and the decomposition of wage differentials”, 
Journal of Econometrics, vol. 61, pp. 5-21.  
Said M. (2003), “The distribution of gender and public pay sector premia: Evidence from the Egyptian 
organized sector”, School of Oriental and African Studies Working paper, University of London, 
n° 132.  
Söderbom M., Teal F., Wambugu A., Kahyarara G. (2004), “Dynamics of returns to education in 
Kenyan and Tanzanian manufacturing“, CSAE Working Paper Series, 2003-17, University of 
Oxford. 
World Bank (1994), Royaume du Maroc vers le 21e siècle : renforcement du secteur privé au Maroc, 
Report  #11894-MOR, Washington. 
World Bank (2001), Kingdom of Morocco: Poverty Update, Vol. I: Main Report, Report No. 215-
MOR, March 30, Washington. 
World Bank (2002), “Moroccan manufacturing sector at the turn of the century”, FACS-Morocco, 
Joint project of the Ministère de l’Industrie, du Commerce, de l’Energie et des Mines du Maroc 
and The World Bank. 
Weichselbaumer D., Winter-Ebmer R. (2005), “A meta-analysis of the international gender wage 
gap”, Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 19(3), pp. 479-511. 
 
